In this paper, we develop formal authorization allocation algorithms for role-based access control (RBAC) 
Introduction
Recently, role based access control (RBAC) has been widely used in database system management and operating system products. RBAC involves individual users being associated with roles as well as roles being associated with permissions (Each permission is a pair of objects and operations). As such, a role is used to associate users and permissions. A user in this model is a human being. A role is a job function or job title within the organization associated with authority and responsibility.
Permission is an approval of a particular operation to be performed on one or more objects. As shown in Figure 1 , the relationships between users and roles, and between roles and permissions are many-to-many. (i.e. a permission can be associated with one or more roles, and a role can be associated with one or more permissions). The security policy of the organization determines role membership and the allocation of each roles capabilities. 
Figure 1. RBAC relationship
In 1993, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed prototype implementations, sponsored external research [6] , and published formal RBAC models [7, 9] . Many organizations prefer to centrally control and maintain access rights, not so much at the system administrator's personal discretion but more in accordance with the organization's protection guidelines [5] . RBAC is being considered as part of the emerging SQL3 standard for database management systems, based on their implementation in Oracle 7 [13] . Many RBAC practical applications have been implemented [3, 8, 14] .
However, there is a consistency problem when using RBAC management. For instance, if there are hundreds of roles and thousands of users in a system, it is very dif-ficult to maintain consistency because it may change the authorization level, or imply high-level confidential information to be derived when more than one role is requested and granted.
We develop formal approaches to check the conflicts and therefore help allocate the roles without compromising the security. The formal approaches are based on relational structure, relational algebra, which has a set of complete and sound axioms. As far as we know, this is the first kind of work in this area to address the formal approaches for role allocation and conflict detection.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we identify the problems related to role assignment and revocation. Relational algebra-based authorization granting algorithm and revocation algorithms are developed in section 3. In section 4, we review an anonymity scalable electronic commerce payment scheme. We then apply the formal authorization approaches to this scheme in section 5. Comparisons with related work are discussed in section 6 and the conclusions are in section 7.
Problem Definitions
With RBAC, users cannot associate with permissions directly but roles. Permissions must be authorized for roles, and roles must be authorized for users. The RBAC security model has two components: Å ¼ and Å ½ [14] . Model component Å ¼ , called the RBAC authorization database model, defines the RBAC security properties for authorization of static roles. Static properties of an RBAC authorization database include role hierarchy, inheritance, cardinality, and static separation of duty. Å ½ called the RBAC activation model, defines the RBAC security properties for dynamic activation of roles. Dynamic properties include role activation, permission execution, dynamic separation of duties, and object access. In particular, the RBAC model supports the specification of several aspects.
a. User/role associations -the constraints specifying user authorizations to perform roles; b. Role hierarchies -the constraints specifying which role may inherit all of the permissions of another role; c. Duty separation constraints -these are role/role associations indicating conflict of interest:
c1. Static separated duty (SSD) -a constraint specifying that a user cannot be authorized for two different roles; c2. Dynamic separated duty (DSD) -a constraint specifying that a user can be authorized for two different roles but cannot act simultaneously in both;
d. Cardinality -the maximum number of users allowed, i.e. how many users can be authorized for any particular role (role cardinality), e.g., only one manager.
A comprehensive administrative model for RBAC must account for all four issues mentioned above, among others. However, user-role assignment is a particularly critical administrative activity. This is because assigning people to tasks is a normal managerial function and assigning users to roles is a natural part of assigning users to tasks. Therefore this paper will focus on user-role assignment.
Let be a database with a set of relations Ê Ä, a set of attributes . Ê Ä includes ROLES, USERS, Can-assign, Can-revoke, SEN-JUN, and Role-User etc.
includes attributes such as RoleName, UserID, UserName etc from the relations. Ê ½ is a set of roles Ê ½ Ö ½ Ö ¾ Ö Ò ; Í is a set of users Í Ù ½ Ù ¾ Ù Ð . Roles are in two categories, one is administrative roles (admin.role), the other is regular roles (role) that need to be assigned to or revoked from users by administrative roles. The roles assigned to a user by administrators may be in conflicts. For example, SSD and DSD relationships may not be sympathetic with the roles associated with the user; on the other hand, because of role hierarchies, the user may still have the permissions of a role which has been revoked. In the latter case, the user is able to access objects and has operations on the objects. The problems arising in processes of assigning and revocation are evident. Authorization granting problem -How to check whether a role is in conflict with the roles of a user?
Authorization revocation problem -How to find whether permissions of a role have been revoked from a user or not?
For example, Figure 2 shows a system administrative role ( ShopSO ) in a shop to manage regular roles such as SELLER, AUDITOR and MANAGER. Role MANAGER inherits SELLER and AUDITOR. SELLER has a DSD relationship with AUDITOR. The administrative role ShopSO can assign a user to be AUDITOR or SELLER but not both simultaneously, otherwise it compromises the security of the shop system. It is easy to find conflicts between roles when assigning roles to a user in a small database system but it is hard to find them when there are thousands of roles in a system. Our aim is to provide relational algebra algorithms to solve the problems and then automatically check conflicts when assigning and revoking. The ROLES relation in Figure 2 is in Table 1 . The attribute SELLERC shows whether the role SELLER is conflicting with the RoleName in the relation or not. For instance, in the third tuple, a user with role SELLER has conflicts with the role AUDITOR. Table 1 . The relation ROLES in Figure 1 USERS -This relation has two attributes UserID, UserName , UserID is the identity of a user and UserName, which domain is the set of a list of users in the system. UserID and UserName are recorded for each user. UserName is the primary key for the table. For example, there are two users David and Tony in the system of Figure 2 . The USERS relation is in Table 2 .
UserID UserName 0001 David 0002 Tony Table 2 . The relation USERS in Figure 1 Roles are managed by administrative roles. Senior roles are shown at the top of the hierarchies. Senior roles inherit permissions from junior roles. Let Ü Ý denote Ü is senior to Ý with obvious extension to Ü Ý.
SEN JUN -This is a relation of roles in a system. Senior is the senior of the two roles. Table 3 expresses the SEN JUN relationship in Figure 2 .
ROLE USER -defines a relationship between USERS and ROLES RoleName, UserName .
RoleName is a foreign key RoleName in the ROLES. It explains a role is assigned to a user.
UserName is a foreign key UserName from the USERS. Suppose MANAGER is assigned to user Tony and SELLER to user David, Table 4 It is easy to know a role set associated with a user from ROLE USER. Therefore, the authorization granting problem can be changed to whether a role is conflicting with a set of roles Ê or not.
Authorization granting and revocation algorithms based on relational algebra
We will develop granting and revocation algorithms based on relational algebra in this section. The notion of a prerequisite condition, Can-assign and Can-revoke is a key part in the processes of user-role assignment [15] .
A prerequisite condition is an expression using boolean operators and on terms of the form Ü and Ü where Ü 
¥
User-role assignment (UA) is authorized by Can-assign relation. Table 5 shows the can-assign relations with the prerequisite conditions in the example.
The meaning of Can-assigń
member of the administrative role ShopSO can assign a user whose current membership satisfies the prerequisite condition SHOP to be a member of roles SELLER and AU-DITOR. To identify a role range within the role hierarchy, the following closed and open interval notation is used.
Admin.role 
Supposing an administrator role ADrole wants to assign a role Ö to a user with a set of roles Ê. Ê £ is an extension Table 6 is that a member of the administrative role Shop can revoke membership of a user from any role in [Shop, MANAGER).
Authorization granting algorithm
Due to role hierarchy, a role Ü ¼ has all permissions of role Ü when Ü ¼ Ü . A user with two roles Ü ¼ Ü still has the permissions of Ü if only to revoke Ü from the user. The explicit member of a role Ü is a set of user Í ´Í Üµ ¾ Í and the implicit member of role Ü is a set of user Í Ü ¼ Ü ´Í Ü ¼ µ ¾ Í . To solve the authorization revocation problem, we need to revoke the explicit member of a role first if a user is an explicit member, then revoke the implicit member.
Following are two algorithms for revocation of a role Ö from a set of roles Ê by an administrative role ADrole, where Ê is a set of roles which are assigned to a user. The A user still has permissions of a role which has been weakly revoked if a role associated with the user seniors the role revoked. To solve the authorization revocation problem, we need strong revocation which requires revocation of both explicit and implicit membership. Strong revocation of a user's membership in Ü requires that the user be removed not only from explicit membership in Ü, but also from explicit and implicit membership in all roles senior to Ü. Strong revocation therefore has a cascading effect upwards in the role hierarchy. In the remaining parts of this paper, the new relational algebra approaches will be used with a payment scheme. We review the payment scheme first.
Weak revocation Algorithm

Strong revocation algorithm
Review of the anonymity scalable electronic payment scheme
Algorithms will be used in a consumer anonymity scalable payment scheme. The payment scheme provides different degrees of anonymity for consumers. Consumers can decide the levels of anonymity. They can have a low level of anonymity if they want to spend coins directly after withdrawing them from the bank. Consumers can achieve a high level of anonymity through an anonymity provider (AP) agent without revealing their private information and are secure in relation to the bank because the new certificate of a coin comes from the AP agent who is not involved in the payment process. The scheme is briefly reviewed below [18] .
Electronic cash has sparked wide interest among cryptographers ( [12, 20, 10, 17] , etc.). In its simplest form, an e-cash system consists of three parts (a bank, a consumer and a shop) and three main procedures withdrawal, payment and deposit. Besides the basic participants, a third party named anonymity provider (AP) agent is involved in the scheme. The AP agent will help the consumer to get the required anonymity but will not be involved in the purchase process. The model is shown in Figure 3 . The AP agent gives a certificate to the consumer when s/he needs a high level of anonymity. 
Figure 3. Electronic cash model
From the viewpoint of banks, consumers can improve anonymity if they are worried about disclosure of their identities. This is a practical payment scheme for Internet purchases because it has provided a solution with different anonymity requirements for consumers. However, consumers cannot get the required level of anonymity if the role BANK and AP are assigned to a user. It means the management of the payment scheme is an important issue. To simplify the management of the scheme and prevent errors in the user-role assignment, we will analyze its management with the relational algebra algorithms.
Applications of the relational algebra algorithms
The new relational algebra algorithms will be applied to the payment scheme in this section. We first consider the relationships of the roles in the scheme, then analyze applications of the relational algebra algorithms.
Duty separation constraints
There are two types in duty separation constraints. One is SSD and another one is DSD. In Figure 4 , for example, The role AP has an SSD relationship with BANK. This is because the duty of the AP is to help a consumer to get a coin with a high level of anonymity. The BANK knows the old coin and its certificate. The AP sends the new certificate of the new coin to the consumer. The role BANK will know the new certificate and new coin if the same staff member from the AP agent and the bank processed the coin for the consumer. If this occurs, the consumer cannot have a coin with the required anonymity because the BANK has known the new coin. The SHOP also has an SSD relationship with the BANK since the BANK verifies the payment as well as depositing the coin to the shop's account. The SSD relationship is also a conflict of interest relationship like the DSD relationship but much stronger. If two roles have a SSD relationship, then they may not even be authorized to the same individual. Thus, the role AP, BANK, and SHOP may never be authorized to the same individual.
An application of the authorization granting algorithm
A hierarchy of roles and a hierarchy of administrative roles are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 5 respectively. Table 7 shows the Can-assign relations with the prerequisite conditions in the scheme and Table 10 shows ROLES relationship (the attribute M1C, for example, shows whether the role M1 is conflicting with the RoleName in the relation or not).
Let us consider the APSO tuples in Table 7 (the analysis for BankSO and ShopSO are similar). The first tuple authorizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite role FPS into members in the AP agent (AP). The second one authorizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite condition È Ë ÇÈ to be quality controllers (QC). Similarly, the third tuple authorizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite condition È Ë É to be operators (OP). The second and third tuple show that the APSO can grant a user who is a member of the AP agent into one but not both of QC and OP. This illustrates how mutually exclusive roles can be forced. However, for the NSSO and SSO these are not mutually exclusive. The fourth tuple authorizes APSO to put a user who is a member of both QC and OP into a manager (M1). Of course a user could have become a member of both QC and OP only by actions of a more powerful administrator than APSO. Table 7 . Can-assign relation in the scheme Assume Bob is a user with role FPS. The administrative role NSSO wants to assign the role AP to Bob. Using the granting algorithm Grant (NSSO, FPS, AP) , the first step,
This means NSSO can assign role AP to Bob. The second step, based on Table 10 ,
It means no conflicts when assigning AP to Bob. Table 8 and Table 9 give the Can-revoke and a part of senior-junior relationship of the payment scheme. E  OP  AP  QC  AP  M1  OP  M1  QC  M1 AP Director M1 Table 9 . A part of SEN-JUN relation of the payment scheme note that Alice should have enough power to weakly revoke Bob's membership from his explicitly assigned roles. For instance, if Alice has activated APSO and then tries to weakly revoke Bob's membership from M1, she is not allowed to proceed because APSO does not have the authority of weak revocation from M1 according to the can-revoke relation in Table 8 . Therefore, if Alice wants to revoke Bob's explicit membership as well as implicit membership from AP by weak revocation, she needs to activate SSO and weakly revoke Bob's membership from AP, QC and M1. This brings about the same result as strong revocation from AP by SSO. However, Alice does not need to revoke Bob's membership from FPS, AU, AUDITOR and E, because they are not senior roles to AP based on the role hierarchy of Figure 6 .
Application of the authorization revocation algorithm
For example, Bob is an explicit member of M1, QC, AU, AP, AUDITOR, FPS and E. If Alice with the activated administrative role SSO strongly revokes Bob's membership from AP, then he is removed not only from explicit membership in AP, also from explicit and implicit membership in all roles senior to AP. Using the strong revocation algorithm Strong revoke(SSO, R, AP),
Step 1, role AP is revoked from Ê since AP is an explicit member.
Step 2,
This means Bob has been removed from M1, QC as well as AP after the strong revocation from AP. However, he still has a membership of FPS, AU, AUDITOR and E, since they are not senior roles to AP based on the role hierarchy of Figure 6 . This brings out the same result as the one after weak revocation from AP, QC, M1 by SSO. Note that all implied revocations upward in the role hierarchy should be within the revocation range of the administrative roles that are active in a session. For instance, if Alice activates APSO and tries to strongly revoke Bob's membership from M1, she is not allowed to proceed because M1 is out of the APSO's can-revoke range in Table 8 .
Related work
There are several other related works on role-based access control models [1] , user-role assignment mechanisms developed for web-based intranets [16] , Oracle system [2] and relational databases [11] .
A role-based separation of duty language (RSL 99) has been recently proposed [1] . It has given a formal syntax and semantics for RSL99 and has demonstrated its soundness and completeness by using functions on conflicting role sets. The proposal is different from ours in two aspects. First, It does not consider the case of the management for conflicting roles. Therefore, there is no support to deal administrative roles with regular roles in the proposal. By contrast, our algorithms provide a rich variety of options that can deal the document of administrative roles with regular roles. Second, the algorithm RSL99 does not provide access control models. It only gives separation of duty (SOD) policies. By contrast, we present a number of specialized authorization algorithms for access control which allow administrators to authorize a role to users or revoke a role from users.
The interaction between RBAC and relational databases are presented in [11] . Two experiments are described. One is a role-based front end to a relational database with discretionary access control. Another one is a role graph to show the roles in a standard relational databases. Some relational concepts like roles, users and permissions etc are provided. Our model also support such concepts even though it has a large variety. However, the main difference between our algorithms and the scheme in [11] is, we focus on the solutions of the conflicts of roles and the latter focuses on the correlation of RBAC with discretionary access controls. Their work discusses the relationship between roles and discretionary access controls, they did not address how to allocate roles to users without conflicts. In our work, we developed detailed algorithms for allocating roles and checking the conflicts.
User-role assignment is also discussed in Oracle system by using SQL [2] . RBAC skills are partly used in [2] . Permissions can be assigned to users directly in Oracle system but not in our work. Another difference between our work and the work in Oracle system is in revocation process. We have demonstrated the weak revocation and the strong revocation that depend on different revocation requirements. However, the revocaton in [2] Finally, a user-role assignment for web-based intranet has been proposed in [16] . In such a model, the RBAC/web system with user-role assignment model (URA97) [15] is extended to decentralize the details of RBAC administration on the web. Authorizations can be given by administrators through prerequisite conditions. However, our work substantially differs from that proposal. Differences are due to the consistency problem arises in [16] :
It is very difficult to keep the consistency by reflecting security requirements between global network objects and local network objects if there are hundreds of roles and thousands of users in a system. This problem is completely overcome in our algorithms because the algorithms focus on the conflicts between roles. The authorization granting algorithm is used to find conflicts and prevent some secret information to be derived while the strong revocation algorithm is used to check whether a role still has permissions of another role.
Conclusions
This paper has provided new authorization allocation algorithms for RBAC that are based on relational algebra operations. They are the authorization granting algorithm, weak revocation algorithm and strong revocation algorithm. The algorithms can automatically check conflicts when granting more than one role to a user in a system. They can prevent users from accessing unauthorized use of facilities when users change position within the organization and demand the modification of security rights. The roles can be allocated without compromising the security in RBAC and provide secure management for systems. The complexities of the algorithms are also analyzed. Furthermore, we have reviewed the consumer scalable anonymity payment scheme and discussed how to use the algorithms for the electronic payment scheme.
